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Lessons from the Iranian Experience:
NATIONAL CURRENCIES AS INTERNATIONAL MONEY
John E. Hoffman, Jr. and Ian H. Giddy
MR. MUNDHEIM: We are ready now to look at the U.S. govern-
ment freeze of Iranian government assets and some of the implica-
tions that action has for banking znd lending policies and practices.
John Hoffman, who, as counsel for a major bank, played a leading
role in the negotiations which resulted in the release of the hos-
tages held in Iran and in the unfreezing of a substantial portion of
the Iranian assets held by U.S. banks, will begin our discussion.
1. THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE
MR. HOFFMAN: It is fair to say that from the very imposition
of the Iranian asset freeze, attention focused on the question of
the consequences of the freeze and the lessons to be learned from
the experience, wholly apart from the question of the effectiveness
of the freeze as a means to compel the Iranians to perform in a way
satisfactory to the U.S. government.
There was a great deal of consideration given to the poten-
tial effect of the freeze on the foreign exchange markets and the
money markets. The announcement of a threat by Iran to withdraw its
deposits from the U.S. banking system had been one of the factors
that triggered the freeze. Ironically, the question arose, would
imposition of a freeze have the consequence of influencing withdraw-
al of other foreign deposits from U.S. banks? Would Eurodollar de-
posits, particularly in branches of U.S. banks overseas, become a
sort of endangered species as a result of this exercise?
As a result of the experience with Iran, we now know more
about the nature and liquidity of the Eurodollar market, as well as
the risks of placing and receiving Eurodollar deposits within that
market. These and other issues that made up the financial backdrop
of the Iranian experience will be the subject of our discussion.
A. Imposition of the Freeze
To set the stage, let us turn back to November 1979. You
will recall that on November 14, 1979, President Carter imposed a
freeze on certain Iranian government and government-related assets.
I think it is worth taking a moment to read the presidential an-
nouncement. It states: "I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United
States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and
economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency
to deal with that threat. I hereby order blocked all property and
interests in property of the government of Iran, its instrumentali-
ties and controlled entities in the Central Bank of Iran which are
or become subject to jurisdiction of the United States, or which
are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States." [1]
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At the same time as the Presidential Executive Order was
issued, the White House put out a press release further describing
the action this way: "The President has today acted to block all
official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in
United States banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries.
This order is in response to reports that the government of Iran is
about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to ensure
that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are pro-
vided for in an orderly manner. The order does not affect accounts
of persons other than the government of Iran, the Central Bank of
Iran, and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved
cannot be ascertained at this time but there is no reason for dis-
turbance in the foreign exchange or other markets." [2]
The imposition of a freeze of this nature was not a novel
exercise on the part of the U.S. government. There were precedents
for the regulations that were issued that day to govern the nuts-
and-bolts operation of the Iranian freeze. These precedential situ-
ations involved Cuba and China as well as other countries. [3]
What did the freeze purport to affect? What was its desired
effect, financially and economically? Prior to this time, Iran had
been receiving approximately fifty million dollars a day in oil
revenue. These funds found their way into deposits that were main-
tained by Iran with U.S., European, and Japanese banks. Many of
these deposits were denominated in dollars at branches of U.S. banks
overseas, predominantly in London. These accounts were a prime tar-
get for the freeze.
B. Attack on the Freeze Outside the United States
The question of the President's authority to freeze the ac-
counts very quickly became the subject of litigation in London and
in Paris. Within two weeks of the imposition of the freeze, the
Central Bank of Iran sued five American banks in London (with which
it maintained very large dollar deposits) claiming its right to im-
mediate payment of the funds, asserted to be more than three billion
dollars in Iranian external reserves. The Iranian complaint was
very simple. It stated that Iran had maintained the deposits, that
they were now due, that they had been demanded, and that they had
not been paid. In effect, Iran came in with a summary judgment
application, which said that somebody owed them some money and would
not pay it.
C. Defense of the Freeze
The defenses asserted by the banks in these actions were pre-
mised on three main theories. One of them, which will be the primary
focus of our attention this afternoon, derives from the operation of
the presidential freeze. The freeze defense was based on the propo-
sition that the President could freeze dollar deposits maintained on
the books of an American bank branch overseas by the imposition of
an executive order, without necessarily intruding into the sovereign-
ty of the foreign country where the branches were located or creating
a conflict with the laws of that country. More of this in just a
moment.
The second line of defense, which was founded on a public
policy argument, held that the courts of England should not honor the
Iranian claims because they had behaved in a barbaric fashion and had
violated the law of nations. A third defense, based on the Breton-
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Woods agreement, would deny Iran the right to recover on the accounts.
I do not propose to spend any time discussing the second and third
lines of defense, as most of our attention was focused on the first
line of defense: namely, the way in which the freeze affected the
Eurodollar accounts.
I should mention that the banks all had substantial setoff
claims against the deposits, based on their claims against Iran for
various loans. Another issue that played a major role in the liti-
gation in Paris involved the proposition, under French law, that if
an American bank were precluded, by virtue of some legal problem in
the U.S., from paying out dollars from a dollar deposit in France
but was not precluded from paying in francs, it had an obligation to
convert the dollar claim of Iran into francs. That issue has not
yet been resolved and it is doubtful, at this point, that it will be.
I would like to focus our attention on the defense of the
American banks based on the operation of the freeze. From a legal
and a tactical point of view, it appeared preferable to structure
this defense on the premise that the manner of operation of the
accounts was well known to the depositor, who understood that no
transfers could be made out of a dollar deposit account in London
unless the transfers were made through the New York clearing system.
Recognition of that fact was, indeed, a term of the contract of de-
posit. President Carter had therefore acted within the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S. by freezing the ability to transfer the
dollar accounts. According to this theory, the freeze would not
create any conflict with the laws of England or English national
rights.
This was a defense that was to be established by proving the
long term method of operation of such accounts. The defense, how-
ever, was not tried in the English court, nor will it be, due to the
settlement reached in the Algerian accords. This experience provided
a crash course for many people in the nature and operations of Euro-
dollar accounts. I would like to turn to my colleague, Ian Giddy,
who will describe in greater detail how the English courts would have
come out on this issue had they had the chance.
2. EURODOLLARS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM
MR. GIDDY: This is a story about the Eurodollar market, how
transfers are made between banks in the Eurodollar market, how in 1979
Bank Markazi, Iran's Central Bank, expected to receive return of its
funds in London despite the deposit freeze, and why it did not. This
is also a story about the Eurodollar transfer system and the impli-
cations of the freeze for the future of the international payments
and the Eurodollar market.
A. Nature of Eurodollars
First, a little lesson in money. One of the initial questions
that was asked of me as a consultant to Shearman & Sterling and an-
other law firm in the Iranian deposit freeze case was, are Eurodol-
lars money? And if so, what kind of money? Fortunately, I never had
to give the answer in court. But in the professional writing on this
subject, most economists agree that Eurodollars are not money, strict-
ly defined. They are more akin to what economists define as quasi-
money.
[273 1
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
J.E Hoffman, Jr., I.L. Giddy INational currencies as international money
The difference is simply that you cannot make a payment with
quasi-money; you first have to convert it into something else. Let
us get back to the question of what a Eurodollar is, if it is not
money.
Eurodollars are bank deposits denominated in dollars outside
the borders of the U.S., and Euro-currencies are bank deposits in
currencies other than that of the country in which the bank or bank
branch is located. There is nothing special about the deposits.
They are mostly time deposits. They are simply deposited outside
the country of the currency in which they are denominated.
The important feature of Eurodollars is that they are subject
to different jurisdictions and, therefore, different regulations.
The sine qua non of a Eurodollar is that the regulations to which
Eurodollar deposits are subject are less onerous, creating lower
costs for the banks issuing those deposits. Those lower costs enable
the bank to offer a higher interest rate on the deposit, which is
what attracts funds out of national markets and into the Eurodollar
market.
B. Risks of Holding Eurodollar Deposits
The higher interest rate, though, does not come free. In the
Eurodollar market it is accompanied by a different set of risks faced
by depositors who place their funds there. Those risks are fairly
well understood by depositors, central banks, domestic corporations,
and multinational firms. Those risks were fairly well understood,
that it, until the Iranian deposit freeze took place; then a new kind
of risk was highlighted.
" CONDITION OF BANK
" CENTRAL BANK BACKING
" HOST COUNTRY POLITICAL RISK
" TRANSFER RISK
Exhibit I: EURODOLLARS DEPOSIT RISK
Exhibit 1 lists four sets of Eurodollar risks. These risks
include, first, the condition of the bank itself. The second risk
arises from the nationality of the bank, or more accurately, the re-
liance that one can place on the central bank backing it up. One
would normally prefer to have a deposit in a bank that has access to
the same currency as the one in which the deposit is denominated,
which is why American banks have had such an advantage in issuing
dollar deposits abroad. The third risk is the host country's politi-
cal risk or the sovereign risk--in other words, the risk that the
Bahamian authorities might freeze up all Eurodollar deposits in
Nassau and that the dollars might not be repaid. One could answer
that the dollars are not really in Nassau so they can always be re-
paid; but this is not as clear cut as it seems because, after all,
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there have been instances of countries seizing foreign banks. This
occurred, for example, in Saigon and Peru. In some cases, depositors
lost their funds entirely, and even those who have recovered their
money have suffered extended delays.
The new element of risk is the transfer risk, which arose out
of the deposit freeze. The transfer risk stems from the fact that
Eurodollars themselves are not narrowly-defined money. They are
quasi-money. People do not make payments with Eurodollars. PeoPle
make payments with U.S. dollars, which means that they make payments
through the U.S. banking system. Thus, despite the fact that the
Carter deposit freeze applied only within the jurisdiction of the
U.S., it effectively applied not only to the assets held within the
U.S., but also to the offshore deposits denominated in dollars in
U.S. banks in London, in Paris, and elsewhere.
GOLD AND SECURITIES HELD
BY NEW YORK FED
S 2.s8
EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS LOANS AND DEPOSITS




Exhibit 2: OFFICIAL IRANIAN ASSETS FROZEN ON NOV. 14, 1979
Let me refer you to Exhibit 2. Assets of approximately $12
billion were effectively frozen on November 14, 1979. This sum in-
cludes gold and securities held in the Fed and the U.S. Treasury
(which, of course, were immediately seized), loans and deposits in
U.S. firms, and about $2 billion of deposits in U.S. banks. However,
about half of the total--for us the more interesting part--was the
$5.5 billion in banks abroad, mainly in London, mainly in five U.S.
banks.
C. International Dollar Payments System
How was that effectively frozen? Bank Markazi claimed that it
was not frozen at all and wanted its money back immediately. Exhibit
3 indicates how the U.S. and international dollar payments system
1275 ]
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works and how Bank Markazi would have received its money. The dollar
payments system works quite simply as follows.
LONDON NEW YORK
BANK JARKAZI CHEMICAL BANK
INSTRUCTION CHIP' 'S
INSTRUCTION
CITIBANK, LONDON - - - - CITIBANK,NEW YORK
SWIFT
Exhibit 3: THE INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR PAYMENT SYSTEM
Bank Markazi is in London and the dotted line is the demand
it put to Citibank and to other banks in London that it wanted its
money back--the dollar deposits held in London. It said, "Give it
back here in London. It is not in the United States."
A payment between two banks in London, however, is made in
New York. This situation puzzles a lot of people including econo-
mists, but that is the way it works. To make a payment, Bank Mar-
kazi sends an instruction to Citibank in London specifying the amount
and exactly which account the money is to be paid into. That speci-
fied account is an account in New York, for example, in Chemical Bank
if Markazi had an account there.
Citibank, London, of course, has an account in its New York
head office. Through the international payments communication sys-
tem, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers), a
message is sent to Citibank,New York to remove money from Citibank,
London's account and transfer it to Chemical Bank. This transfer is
effected through the domestic payments system used for international
dollar payments or CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System),
the clearing house system in New York. The payment would be executed
on the same day as the instruction is sent from London and the pay-
ment issued through the CHIPS system would be paid in so-called
clearinghouse funds. The CHIPS system is simply an offsetting mech-
anism where dozens, indeed hundreds, of banks abroad with accounts
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in New York make payments to one another through other accounts in
New York. Every day these totals paid into and out of various banks
(and even within banks) are totalled up. At the end of the day the
CHIPS people figure out who owes whom what, and the net amount that
is owed. The net amount owed between the fourteen settlement banks
is then transferred in real money the following day, and the real
money is no longer so-called clearinghouse funds but dollar bills
or their equivalent, deposits in accounts at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Exhibit 4 shows an example of a CHIPS settlement,
with Chemical Bank and Citibank making various payments to one an-
other. At the end of day one, the net amount is totalled up and the
following day that net amount is paid. If Citibank turns out to owe
Chemical Bank a certain amount, it is paid through the "Fed wire",
i.e., through transfers between accounts at the New York Federal
Reserve or at other Federal Reserve banks.
CHEMICAL BANK CHEMICAL BANK
CHIPS
CITIBANK,NEW YORK CITIBANK,NEW YORK
Exhibit 4: TWO U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEMS
That is how it works. It all goes through the U.S. clearing
system, CHIPS, and ultimately gets paid in what everybody terms
"good money", money that can earn interest because it constitutes
scarce reserves at the Fed. Because all this has to go through New
York, any payment made between two banks in London, including be-
tween Markazi and Citibank, was subject to the freeze the moment it
started to pass through the New York clearing system since the freeze
applied to transfers not only made by, but also on behalf of, Bank
Markazi or any other entity of the national government in Iran. The
freeze was not necessarily confined to U.S. banks but the U.S. govern-
ment chose not to try to impose it on foreign banks as well.
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To conclude, one of the questions that arose out of this case
and one of the first thoughts that occurred to Bank Markazi and its
lawyers at Stephenson Harwood was, why don't you try to make the
payment in some other way? There are several ways in which you can
make this payment in London. If Bank Markazi wants to be paid by
Citibank, one way is the wheelbarrow method: the dollar bills are
wheeled down the Strand in London from Citibank's branch to Markazi's.
Unfortunately, the sums involved would have meant such a huge wheel-
barrow, such a huge shipment, that the banks were simply going to
argue that this was not a normal, accepted means of payment and so
they were not obliged to do it.
There are other methods, asserted Markazi. They could have
paid in gold or securities, or they could have made the payment in
the equivalent amount in some other foreign currency. Citibank and
other banks argued, with some merit, that none of these was the nor-
mal and expected means of payment. However, of course, the case was
never decided in court. So we do not know yet whether the courts
would have decided that Citibank was obliged to make that payment.
D. CHIPS
The Iranian freeze called into question the whole system of
international financial transfers denominated in dollars. It is a
system that has worked extraordinarily well. This system is part of
the reason for the fact that fifty-two percent of world trade and
seventy-two percent of the Euro-currency market is denominated in
U.S. dollars. About ninety-five percent of all foreign exchange
transactions in the world goes through the U.S. dollar payments sys-
tem, even between, for example, the German mark and the Swiss franc.
In other words, the CHIPS system has to handle the great bulk of in-
ternational transactions in the world. On an average day CHIPS
handles $160 billion worth of payments, which is confined to inter-
national transactions and does not include U.S. transactions. A
$160 billion may not sound like very much, but the total world trade
that occurred in 1980 was about $1.8 trillion. Therefore, CHIPS
could handle in twelve trading days the whole of 1980's world trade
--all the oil and goods and so forth that passed among all the coun-
tries in the world.
Why does it have to go through CHIPS? First, it is rather
efficient if everybody everywhere in the world knows that there is
only one payment system, only one location to which they have to
make payments when doing transactions with one another. It is like
having only one currency for doing different sorts of transactions
instead of having to go through many payment systems. But the fun-
damental reason why everything goes through CHIPS instead of, for
example, an alternative clearing system in London such as is being
proposed, is that any payment system that involves settlements be-
tween banks over time rather than instantaneously, involves out-pay-
ments sometimes preceding in-payments. The CHIPS system is settled
on a two day basis. The amount that is transferred between banks
in any one day is settled in Fed funds the following day. In the
future, same-day settlement will be instituted but the principle
remains.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/8
I.E. loffman, Jr., 1.1H. Giddy i National arrencies as intentational money 81
10 a.m. ----_ BANK B
II a-m.
noon B - BA C
A
1 p.m. N





Exhibit 5: CHIPS INTRADAY SETTLEMENT RISK
Exhibit 5 indicates what happens on a typical trading day
during which international payments go through the CHIPS system.
They are not paid in real money yet. They are only paid in clearing-
house funds, which is an understanding that real money will be paid
the following day, or (when CHIPS moves to a same-day clearing sys-
tem) later on the same day. This, however, takes time and Bank A,
for example, may have various payments coming in and out during the
day. At any one point, Bank A may make an out-payment in expecta-
tion that they will receive an offsetting in-payment later on be-
cause these two transactions already have been concluded. They are
just waiting for the clearing system to take effect.
What would happen if, at any point before these transactions
offset one another, somebody interrupts the payment system? Some-
body closes down the system, or the computer breaks down, or they
were expecting a payment from Bank C which is located in Iran and
all of a sudden Bank C does not make the payment, or the central
bank of that country closes down the bank, or something else goes
wrong. In other words, the offsetting payment does not come in be-
fore the end of the clearing day. Then all these payments and set-
tlements would have to be unwound. There would be a great deal of
uncertainty as to who owed what to whom aet that particular point.
There would be concern about who was suspect, and to whom you could
make out-payments prior to receiving offsetting in-payments. The
whole system would slow down and a liquidity crisis could result.
The reason CHIPS works so well is that people have confidence in it.
If anything of this nature were to go wrong, there are twelve major
U.S. banks that are members and therefore backers, essentially in-
surers of the CHIPS system; the Federal Reserve is assumed to be
standing behind these banks. All these banks have access to the U.S.
central bank.
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A similar system could be set up in London for dollar pay-
ments between banks but so far there has been an unwillingness on
the part of any institution or set of institutions to make the
investment and take the risks that would be involved in backing a
system to assure all payees that they ultimately would get paid any
transfer that was due them. Part of the reason for the reluctance
is that it would be a dollar payment system in a sterling country.
It would have to be backed up by sterling-based banks and ultimate-
ly by the Bank of England. This is largely why the international
payment system goes through the U.S. and will continue to do so.
3. EFFECTS OF THE FREEZE
A. Deposits with-U.S. Banks Abroad
Despite all the concern that was voiced in 1979 when the
Iranian deposit freeze was first imposed, concern about the dis-
ruption that would result in the international dollar deposit and
payment system, very little in fact occurred. The system has proved
extraordinarily resilient. Even the fear that U.S. banks would lose
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Exhibit 6: EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS I' U.S. BANKS
Source: rEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
Based on Federal Reserve data, this diagram indicates the
total amount of deposits in U.S. banks abroad denominated in dollars;
that total climbed through 1978 and 1979 at a quick pace and con-
tinued to climb in 1980. Of that total, the bulk was from non-
residents of the U.S. Those deposits dropped slightly after the
freeze (indicated by the dotted line) but rebounded shortly there-
after. There has been no mass outflow of deposits from U.S. banks
I
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or from the U.S. dollar or Eurodollar market as a whole. The reason
is simply that even if you have U.S. dollars in a bank abroad and
you are subject to this transfer risk, you can protect yourself in
various ways--for example, by having a clause in any deposit con-
tract or an understanding even in unwritten contracts that the de-
positor has the option of receiving payment in another currency,
should the original currency of denomination be frozen. However,
this agreement will not be costless because if that were to happen,
the banks themselves might be subject to the risk of having to pay
out in another currency while the currency in which the deposit was
made was frozen. Although one can obtain such protection, as with
any other form of risk reduction, it is not going to come free. Banks
will surely either protect themselves against the risk by stating
their exemption from such obligations or, if they provide the option
to pay in another currency, they will pay a lower interest rate or
charge for that insurance in some fashion.
B. Application of the Freeze to Cover and Foreign Currency Accounts
MR. MUNDHEIM: Let me ask Bob Carswell to answer one question
that flows from that very good explanation of Ian's. Ian's explana-
tion certainly indicates that cover accounts in dollars would also be
included in a U.S. government freeze. That is, a Eurodollar deposit
in Barclay's Bank would also be caught. Why were those cover accounts
specifically excepted by the regulations? Ian's other point was that
if the deposit agreement had an alternative payments clause, that
clause would likely free the deposit from the risk of being effective-
ly frozen. Again, there was a general license for Iranian deposits
in U.S. banks abroad denominated in currency other than dollars.
Could you explain why those two situations were not ultimately sub-
jected to the freeze?
MR. CARSWELL: There is some history that may not be publicly
recorded, but during World War II the Treasury came up with a cover
account theory. The theory was that any dollar transfer, wherever
located, ultimately had to be done through what was known then as a
cover account in the U.S. It was not really a cover account, but the
way the transactions worked was known as the cover account theory.
I believe a reference to this may have appeared in one lower court
decision.
In subsequent blockings (the Chinese, North Korean, Vietnam-
ese, and the Cuban blockings) the issue came up only peripherally, be-
cause there were no significant overseas dollar deposits by any of
those countries, at least that anybody knew about, and hence, nobody
ever really focused on this problem. From time to time an event did
occur where an overseas dollar transaction popped up, and the Office
of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury did occasionally invoke the
cover account theory to deal with it. For example, in one instance
when the Vietnamese tried to make a dollar transfer, and the dollars
had to come back to the U.S., Foreign Assets Control took some action.
In any event, the cover account theory was discussed in the
Treasury during all those years but I am not aware of its having
been really used. When the Iranian blocking came along, everybody
recognized that all of a sudden we had something that was unique.
U.S. banks had these huge deposits abroad, and if the freeze was go-
ing to mean anything, you had to block them. The question was how
far you went with a theory that had very sparse legal background,
that is, no court decisions that meant anything--and where there
were practical limitations to its enforceability. We just had to
make a very quick policy judgment on how far one could press the
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theory. The judgment was not to go for the full cover account
theory and block overseas dollar accounts in foreign banks, thereby
taking on foreign banks and their regulators in all the jurisdic-
tions where dollar accounts were situated. At least, as far as U.S.
banks were involved, we had them here anyway, and it was going to
be less likely that they could protest. It was simply a practical
judgment.
We decided not to include foreign currency accounts in the
overseas branches of U.S. banks for the same practical reason.
Again, the U.S. government can get to the U.S. banks because the
U.S. banks are sitting here with their head offices. In theory we
could have said to Chemical Bank in Paris, "Don't pay out the franc
account that you have for the Bank Markazi." They would then have
been subject to the excruciating problem of which regulator they
should listen to--the French or the U.S. It seemed very clear that
we were going to have nationalism problems of a high order if we
tried to block the franc deposits. Hence, we decided not to do that
either.
MR. NICHOLS: But you did.
MR. CARSWELL: I am sorry. We did include them at first, but
then within a week or so we reversed that decision because it was
perfectly clear it was going to get us in a lot more trouble than
the pressure it might put on the Iranians.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Well, in light of your explanation that there
are practical difficulties in applying the freeze theory to what I
will loosely characterize as cover accounts and to foreign currency
accounts, one is then driven, John, to the question of why foreign
depositors would not make all their dollar deposits through the
branches of non-U.S. banks, since as a practical matter they would
recognize that in the event of a freeze it is unlikely that the
government would move to a cover account theory to catch those as-
sets.
MR. HOFFMAN: I would suppose that the foreign depositors
would be best qualified to answer that question. The evidence that
Ian Giddy has pointed to has demonstrated that this was not the con-
sequence that flowed from the Iranian freeze, although there was
some speculation that there might be a movement in that direction.
People did not, in fact, take the deposits out of the U.S. foreign
branches and take them all across the street to National Westminster
or Barclay's. The question is, why didn't they in light of the fact
that there was at least some demonstrable incremental risk attand-
ant on keeping the deposits in a U.S. bank branch, rather than in a
foreign bank.
Perhaps I should let Ian Giddy give you the real answers.
But I want to begin by speculating a little bit. There is probably
a combination of reasons. Certainly an American bank holds most of
its earnings in dollars. Its assets are not primarily denominated
in yen, for example. When you put money into a bank, you are anx-
ious to get it back and to see your deposit backed up by assets
that are predominantly in the currency of your deposit. I think
that has to be the prime reason.
Ian Giddy pointed out in his remarks earlier that a U.S. bank
has a direct means of access to the Fed that is not available to a
foreign bank, and that presumably has some bearing on a decision to
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place deposits in U.S. Banks. By the same token, someone who want-
ed to maintain franc accounts would prefer a French bank over a
German bank.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Alec, as a banker what are your thoughts on
the question?
MR. VAGLIANO: As Professor Giddy said, there are four dif-
ferent risks here: the condition of the bank, the central bank
backing, the host country's political risk, and the transfer risk.
Most people, looking at the present situation from their own point
of view, see the Iranian situation as a very special one in which
there was an outrageous act by the Iranian government. They do not
expect their own government (I am speaking now of the foreign depos-
itors) to put them in that kind of a situation; so it is clearly
a risk that is very much discounted at the present time.
Still, it is fair to say that there could be circumstances
under which this is seen as a precedent. A political situation
could arise where people might remember the Iranian occasion, and
the risk would then become more relevant and more immediate, and
it could result in a different decision.
MR. CARSWELL: I think I should say that from where we sat in
the government, we would agree with that, and we were at great pains
to say that all the way through. The Iran blocking was a response
to a particularly outrageous event. It was not, at least as far as
we were concerned, to be regarded as a precedent. Indeed, in the
final settlement we did everything we could (and it worked out suc-
cessfully) to unwind the extraterritorial effect of the whole thing
simultaneously with the release of the hostages. So, there is not
even a vestige of the extraterritorial blocking left and, again,
that was not an accidental policy course.
C. Alternative Payments Systems
MR. MUNDHEIM: Is this alternative payment procedure that you
have mentioned, Ian, a practice which is beginning to gain currency?
MR. GIDDY: There are other reasons besides the transfer risk
for establishing an alternative payments mechanism. Indeed, I have
heard a number of London bankers complain that they have to go
through New York and pay the transatlantic communications cost, and
that they would like to have a payment system in London. It seems
to me that the fact that there are good economic reasons for people
to want the payment system in London or elsewhere and the fact that
this has not emerged, despite several proposals and studies looking
into this, is evidence that the transfer risk has not provided any
great incentive to establish a new system.
There has been absolutely no move towards realistic setting
up of such a system, although it is true that some payments are made
between banks in London for securities purposes, for retail trans-
actions, and for claims among insurance companies.
Bob, could I take the opportunity to reply to one of the ques-
tions sent up from the audience?
MR. MUNDHEIM: Certainly.
MR. GIDDY: There is a question that has been asked of me
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that bears directly on this. The question is, if Bank Markazi asked
Citibank, London to transfer its credit balance on Citibank, London's
books to the account of Barclay's Bank, might this transfer of cred-
it from one account to another in Citibank, London be accomplished
without a transfer through New York? In other words, if two entities
both have an account in Citibank, London, could London just offset
one against the other and not require any transfer through accounts
in banks in New York? That is correct: in principle, offsetting
payments could be made in London within the same bank. From the
evidence that I have seen in relation to the deposit freeze case,
that sort of thing is done very rarely but it is done. So, in prin-
ciple it seems to me that a transfer within a branch to another ac-
count within the branch could be made by Citibank, London on behalf
of Markazi.
MR. NICHOLS: I would like to follow up with one additional
comment. I think it is right, as Ian points out, that as a practi-
cal matter, this is something that can be done. There is a legal
issue involved, however, that I think becomes quite significant
when you consider the amounts that you are talking about in con-
nection with these central bank accounts.
If you have an American bank branch that has a very large
deposit from Customer A and it is very happy to do business with
Customer A in that magnitude, it may not be so happy to do business
with Customer B in the same kind of magnitude, for all sorts of rea-
sons: one being the future relations with Customer B and whether
it is going to be a stable account and all those sorts of things.
So I think there is a very serious legal question whether Customer A
can direct the bank to establish a similar account for Customer B.
I do not think there is anything in the implied contract of deposit
between the bank and Customer A requiring the bank to do business
with Customer B on a similar basis. Such a requirement would be the
consequence of that kind of transfer directed by Customer A, unless,
of course, Customer B has an account.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Our discussion here will not decide the issue
that the British court would have had to decide. We have heard ex-
planations of what the defense would have been; but since we do not
know what the answer of the British court would be, we are left with
a question rather than an answer. However, it is an issue that de-
positors and others who deal with the dollar system have to bear in
mind, and I think all we want to do is to recognize that it is an
open issue and to understand the basis of the U.S. position and the
bank defense.
D. Foreign Currency Accounts
MR. HOFFMAN: I would like to add one other comment that bears
on a couple of things that some of the others on the panel have said
with regard to foreign currency accounts in U.S. banks. It has been
pointed out that almost immediately after the freeze a license was is-
sued which permitted transfers of foreign currency accounts. These
were no longer blocked, for reasons Bob Carswell pointed out. One of
the consequences of that license was the establishment of a fact that
bears on the validity of the legal theory of the freeze defense in
London.
The freeze defense, remember, was predicated on the fact that
dollars always remain in the U.S. All dollar transfers must be done
in the U.S. By the same token, guilders are currency in the Nether-
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lands, not in England or in Japan. If you do a transfer of a guilder
account, another Euro-currency, it has to go through the Netherlands.
Soon after the freeze had been imposed and the license for these
foreign currency transactions had been issued, such a transfer was
made by Bank Markazi, which had a guilder account with a European
branch of an American bank. Markazi directed the transfer to be
made in the bank in the Netherlands, recognizing the fact that such
a transfer must go through the Netherlands because that was the
local currency of deposit.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Robert, you had a comment.
MR. CARSWELL: Let me just close, or try to close, a circle.
I think you ought to remember, in assessing the transfer risk issue,
that when the U.N. imposed sanctions on Rhodesia some years ago, in
the early 1970s, it included the freezing of accounts in its resolu-
tions. The U.K. at that point adopted its own freeze measures in
the U.K. and, in fact, froze Rhodesian pound accounts in the U.K. on
a basis parallel to what the U.S. and other countries did. So, your
transfer risk is not solely an Iranian experience. It does come up,
has come up from time to time, in other jurisdictions. If you start
thinking of what other bank you could go to, to be assured of no
problems, you may have to recognize that there is no sure escape.
I do not suppose anybody can predict where the next tensions will
come, and in what currency and with what relationships they will be
confronted.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Let me ask one additional question in light of
that particular observation. If someone has a dollar deposit with
a London branch of a U.S. bank and the British freeze payments, can
that depositor come to New York and say, "I deposited some dollars
with your bank and now I would like them back."
MR. NICHOLS: No.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Because.
MR. HOFFMAN: No--unless it is specifically spelled out,
which it may be. I believe in many instances if the deposit is
reflected by a certificate of deposit, a CD, the terms may be typed
or written right on the document. If not, it is an implied term of
the deposit contract that is subject to the laws of the country in
which the branch is located. Without taking up a lot of time, I am
convinced that such a position is not inconsistent with the elabo-
ration of the argument we made. Although some people may be will-
ing to debate it on another occasion, I think that it is widely
recognized that if you maintain a deposit on the books of a branch
in London, you are subjecting yourself to regulation and control by
the U.K. Mr. Nichols, would you disagree?
MR. NICHOLS: No, I do not think I would disagree. The Fed
thinks there is a difference between Eurodollars and domestic dol-
lars, and it treats them differently for a number of regulatory
purposes. Obviously the theory is that the Eurodollar market is
less attractive to American depositors because there is a different
level of risk. In other words, everybody has always assumed, or
should have assumed (although I must say I do not think bank deposit
contracts are written as clearly on this point as they might be)
that if you have U.S. dollars on deposit in Nassau, and the Bahamian
government chooses to impose a system that says, "You can get paid
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the dollars in Nassau but you cannot get them out" you will be un-
able to recover against the head office in the U.S. I have always
assumed that everybody understood that this kind of a freeze was a
possibility. Now, the Bahamians are presumably cutting their own
throats in the process, so nobody thinks it is very likely. But
there have been times, I believe, when dollar deposits in the
Bahamas have commanded rates different from those on dollar deposits
in London, because it is assumed that there is a different risk as
between the Bahamas and the U.K.
MR. VAGLIANO: That is right. I think that in the early
period of the Eurodollar market, for example, there were some of the
more conservative Swiss depositors that hesitated about putting
their Euro-deposits in London because of the British risk.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fred, you had a comment?
MR. HELDRING: I have no comment on the legality, but one on
the matter of practice. lie have a branch in Nassau and were one of
the first to have one. We have always thought that if something
happened, we would just transfer our books back to the U.S. and pay.
It is a branch and we pay.
MR. NICHOLS: One New York bank is defending pretty vigorous-
ly a suit for dollar deposits made in its Saigon office, if I am
not mistaken. You also have the fact that if you tell your customer
that you are prepared to pay him in Philadelphia, you are going to
have to keep reserves against the deposit.
There is a very specific Fed interpretation of Regulation D,
which says that if an American bank guarantees repayment at its
head office of a foreign office deposit, then that becomes a U.S.
deposit for Regulation D reserve purposes--and I would assume pro-
bably also for Regulation Q purposes if there were a Q ceiling ap-
plicable.
NOTES
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